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)l.\Cl I)I-'..\T with the weakening- of the absolutistic premises
in i)hilosophic thought, has come the adoption of the pragmatic
method as a modern apologetic for characteristic beliefs of the
Christian religion. The adaptive capacity of pragmatism for this
particular task might l)e claimed to inhere in the genius of the phil-
osophy. The utility for religious faith of the theses for example
embodied in James, "The Will to Believe"' is entirely apparent and
the fuller application of pragmatic principles to religious problems
naturally followed. An excellent idea of the manner of procedure
may be obtained from Professor Drake's critical examination of the
subject in his "Problems of Religion." ^ The author points out with
convincing detail the serious fallacies underlying the pragmatic con-
tentions that we must trust a belief—1. "Because its untruth would
be intolerable:'' 2. "Because our hearts vouch for it;" and 3. "Be-
cause it works."
Ivxamining the positions in the order named, Professor Drake
reminds us that we have no right to assume "that the universe is
constructed so as to comfort and inspire us."- lluman ho])es and
desires have been thwarted too often to leave us any deep-rooted
certainly that our interests, however i)recious, are unalterably sul)-
ser\cd in the nature of things. Indeed much that is tragic in life
inheres in this very state of alTairs. It is to be remembered also
that few, if any beliefs of ni.nikind, have such unif|uc value that
their negatinn would l)c conlinnnusly inlolcrablc. It is gcncrallv
recognized today that the beliefs of men vary profoundly in ac-
cordance with their socially inherited world-views and extreme
1 Durant Drake: I'robUms of RclUji&n—Chap. 21.
2 Ibid, p. 333,
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caution .should be observed in investing any belief with the quality
of absolute indispensableness. If some of life's appalHng experi-
ences are best described in the words of Guyau, "that there is no
help against the inexorable, and no pity to be asked for in a matter
that is in harmony with the interests of the totality of things" would
not man give far nobler proof of his essential spiritual nature in
some Russellian attitude of resignation or defiance than through a
pragmatically supported evasion of the forbidding elements.^
The second demonstration of a belief's validity as quoted
above, involves the heart's indorsement as a criterion of truth. The
exact meaning of the concept of heart and the nature of its preroga-
tives in the problems of faith might be legitimately demanded. If
the notion voices a protest against the old-fashioned exaltation of
reason as an isolated, independent faculty of discernment, the posi-
tion will evoke sympathetic response. Additional support for this
second apologetic might be found in a paragraph from Professor
Hoernle in which he reminds us that austere, negative beliefs are
not necessarily any more in harmony with reality than the hopes
of brighter hue and he sees no reason for us always to clothe
cosmic desires in sack-cloth.* The practical value of the attitude
commends itself, but it does not fully exclude an obvious danger
often latent in the "will-to-believe," that is, an indisposition to use
the resources of investigation and criticism when the easier ways of
decision by feehng stand invitingly open. In a few human problems
perhaps the heart so-called may remain as the only arbiter but these
situations should not be needlessly multiplied. If the bases of in-
tellect are found to rest upon responses essentially emotional, the
deliberative and judicial characteristics of the mental process are not
consequently denied or its authority questioned. The hypotheses of
the heart therefore will be seen to need aid from other sources.
Professor Leuba has written in this connection: "All human needs
have the same function in the discovery of factual truth : they con-
stitute merely demands and incentives. It is the intellect which
passes upon the validity of each proposition affirming, in the inter-
est of any need, objective existence.'^
The third reason stated, that is, the workability of a belief as its
best rationale, is most deserving of comment because of its char-
3,1. M. Guyau: The Non-Religion of the Fiiture, p. 535.
* R. F. A. Hoernle: Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics.
5 J. H. Leuba: Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 9, p. 409. Quoted by
Drake.
586 THE OPEN COURT.
acteristic expression. Professor Drake admits that the assertion of
the principle in its baldest form may represent "distortions or ex-
cesses of pragmatism," but he insists that tlie distortions have been
responsible for much of the attractiveness of the doctrine for the
popular mind.'"' In an incisive analysis, the author takes prayer
for an example and argues: "If a man prays, believing that God
hears him. his belief comforts him and his prayer inspires him.
whether his belief is true or an illusion." " Giving a theological
belief the status of a hypothesis, he contends that "a hypothesis is
not ])roved true simply because it is a conceivable way of explaining
certain facts" and notes that many explanatory scientific theories
apparently well grounded have at length been forced into discard
through the introduction of new facts. ^ The author finds another
difficulty in the recognition of "mutually contradictory faiths that
have worked successfully" and inquires if the startling success of
Christian Science is a proof of its truth.
°
-At this point perha[)s the crux of the whole matter is reached
and we believe that a solution may be discovered in a simple, though
fre(|uently overlooked explanation, of the reason that religions of
the most diverse aims and contradictory claims have often been
found to work. While account may be taken of the elements of
some truth in the content of practically all religions, mav not the
greater emphasis be ])Ut upon two other aspects of the question,
namely, the way in which a given religion has met the emotional
demands of a luunan situation and the manner in which the message
has been delivered. In reference to the first aspect, the words of
Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson may be appropriately quoted, "the fact that
beliefs afl'ord a solution of the riddle of the world which to many
minds is satisfactory does not in itself show anything about their
truth or falsehood. It shows merely the tremendous bias under
which critici.sm has to act." ^" In other words, the avidity with
which a belief is grasped .iiul ilic objectivity of its content ar-
dently affirmed, may be in direct proportion to the stubborn facts
and the chilling reality which contradict it. Pragmatic proofs of
this type are seen therefore to be far from assuring. The second
aspect of the question receives ami)lilication in recalling some of
" Drake, p. .348.
• Ihid. p. :M3.
** Ihid, p. ;m.'-,.
n Ibid, p. .347.
1" G. Ivowes Dickinson: Reliyion, a Criticism and a Forecast, p. 43.
Quoted by Drake.
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the basic cravings of the human spirit and certainly the demands for
the authoritative in rehgion has been one of them. Coupled with this,
the religious imagination has yearned for the explicit and when
formidable bodies of divinity have been proclaimed with absolute
undeviation and exuberant detail, men have invariably responded
to the ultimacy of truth whose most paradoxical characteristic has
often been its inability to outlast the believer's span of years. The
past is too replete with wrecks' of absolute systems that survived but
for a season, to make temporary workability the criterion of truth-
fulness when the main reasons for the successful functioning are
otherwise manifested. That pragmatism may have valuable con-
tributions to make to a philosophy of religion, we do not question,
but services of the nature thus far outlined are apt to become more
devitalizing than helpful in the long run. Far better for religion to
stand on foundations wholly naive, than to accept aid so specious.
Pragmatists of the Schiller type would in all probability strenu-
ously object to the concept of objectivity being associated with re-
ligious belief and the believer's experiences, cut loose from all
ontological considerations, would be made the one and only needed
test of truth. Mr. Joseph Roy Geiger in a recent publication com-
mits himself to precisely this position. He writes, "Furthermore it
is not essential to the reality of the religious mode of experiencing
to demonstrate its ontological status by any sort of dialetical proofs
or apologetics. Religious realities are their own best and only evi-
dence. There is then, no occasion for vouching for or for vindi-
cating their ontological integrity." ^^ Absolutistic philosophies, con-
tends Mr. Geiger, have been responsibe for religion's mesalliance
w^ith ontology. Religion, he continues, "left to work out its own at-
titudes and activities, has been concerned with the realization, pres-
ervation and promotion of concrete human values." ^- But this is
so obviously only one side df the story and fails to do justice to the
larger aspects of the case. Professor Adams presents the other view
needed for a sound historic perspective: "The religious mind . . .
has, from primitive religion through all of the historical religions,
laid claim to possess something of cosmic and universal import
:
it has supposed itself authorized to make some assertion about the
environment of human life and experience, and about some response
which reality makes to the energies of our minds. Religion has
"Joseph Roy Geiger: Some Religious Implications of Pragmatism,
p. 37. University of Chicago Press.
12 Ibid, p. 37.
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claimed to be true as well as relevant to the interests which come to
li^^ht in the life of mind and of reason. It thinks of itself as having-
not only a function within the domain of experience, of man. and of
society, but also as pointing to and disclosing qualities and exis-
tences of the real world. Of all life's interests, religion has been
the most obdurately metaphysical and realistic. Speak as you will
of its pragmatic sanction, its utility, its character as symbolic of
feeling and emotion, or of its functions in man's struggle for ex-
istence, if this other side of religion has escaped your analysis, then
you have missed the heart of it." ^^ Social or sectarian communities,
organized on the basis of definite relations with an unseen order,
have given powerful reinforcement to the idea of the independent,
objective existence of the supra-mundane powers or personalities
supposed to constitute the transcendent realm. The persistence of
religion in the race with its ever-recurring phenomena, the dramatic
rise and fall of ethnic faiths, the historic theodicies and hierarchies
with their varying fortunes, all unreservedly imply a supra-ter-
restrial regime. The soul-stirring discussions of the nature of Christ.
the relation of the historic Jesus to the Trinity, the method of Atone-
ment, together with the depravity and destiny of man, all contained
tremendous, irresistible assumptions of the existence of God, a fact
so patent that proofs of his actual being occupied relatively small
space in the ponderous systems of divinity. May not the associa-
tion of atheism with a feeble mind find its rationale in the con-
clusion that only a fool can doubt in the i)resence of so nuich to
believe. Mr. Bertrand Russell has somewhere said that it takes a
long training in philosophy to convince a man that the chair he is
sitting on is not really ].)resent. Similar difliculties may be yive-
dicted for the pragmatist in his contact with unsophisticated re-
ligionists. Of course, if the latter never get disillusioned they will
continue to furnisli data upon which Mr. Geiger may try out the
new psychologic tcchnicjue he is so anxious to have us perfect.
Might not the prophecy be made that when the t)nlological frame-
work of religion is discanled. that men will not feel inclined to gi\e
social values religious labels, but will gladly adopt these values upon
their own intrinsic merit. Religion might indeed furnish a mytho-
logic background and coloring for the Nalue^ and thus touch morals
with poetry. "S'et we cannot be certain.
'1 he place of religion in the future economv of human interests
»^ G. P. Adams: Idealism and the Modern Age, p. 42.
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affords speculation at once difficult and fascinating. The persistent
credulity of man in the face of the most contrary evidence, supports
the supposition that the older religion may yet have a long future
marked out for it ; indeed its roots may be ineradicable. Further
we must remember that the religious possibilities of an imaginative
naturalism have been larg-ely left undeveloped. Cosmic emotion
might in time become no more of an esoteric possession than the
more rarified mysticisms and Santayana has reminded us that the
Dante of the Copernican cosmology must yet come forth. Religions
have by no means been unadaptive in the long perspectives of their
histories and great years may await those religions that will take
their place in allied ranks, modernly accoutered and unabated in
zeal, yet modest and chastened in the wisdom of a sobering past.
In writing of this better day, Professor Dewey says: "The relig-
ious spirit will be revivified because it will be in harmony with men's
unquestioned scientific beliefs and their ordinary day-by-day social
activities. It will not be obliged to live a timid, half-concealed and
half-apologetic life because tied to scientific ideas and social creeds
that are continuously eaten into and broken down." ^*
i*John Dewey: Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 210,
